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HARDEN v. SuPERIOR CouRT 
J.;'. No. 19244. In Bank. 
\VILLlAM R HARDEN et al., 
PERIOR COUR'l' OF' ALAMEDA 





[1] Prohibition-Grounds-Want or Excess of Jurisdiction.-Con-
of statute or ordinance may be tested pro-
hibition on ground that invalidity of goes to 
jurisdiction of court to proceed to try case. 
[2] !d.-Grounds-Want or Excess of Jurisdiction.-In 
tion, court is limited to proceedings without or in excess of 
jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1102.) 
[3] !d.-Presentation of Objection.-When trial court has de-
termined that it has jurisdiction, prohibition will lie to 
exercise thereof when jurisdiction is in that court 
by demurrer, motion, plea or other of some kind. 
[4] Id.-Grounds-Want or Excess of Jurisdiction.-Where trial 
court has decided in favor of its own and is 
purporting to exercise it, jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction 
has been exercised and higher courts will restrain lower court 
from acting in excess of its jurisdiction. 
[5] !d.-Other Remedies-AppeaL-Fact that appeal is available 
does not, in and of itself, necessarily preclude resort to pro-
hibition. 
[6] Id.- Other Remedies- Appeal.- Code Civ. Proc., § 1103, 
authorizes issuance of writ of prohibition, though appeal may 
be taken, if remedy by appeal is inadequate. 
[7] !d.-Other Remedies-Appea.l.--In usual situation rs 
considered adequate remedy, but no hard and fast rule can 
be laid down in advance whether it fully meets requirements 
of justice in particular case. 
[8] Id.-Other Remedies-AppeaL-A remedy from 
judgment at end of trial is not adequate so as to preclude 
[1] Determination of constitutionality of statute in prohibition 
proceeding, note, 113 A.L.R. 796. See also Cal.Jur., Prohibition, 
§ 4; Am.,Tur., Prohibition, § 32. 
[5] See Cal.Jur., Prohibition,§ 6; Am.Jur., Prohibition,§ 8 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2, 4] Prohibition, § 16(1); Pro-
hibition, §51; [5] Prohibition, § ; [6-9] Prohibition, 14(2); 
[10] Appeal and Error, § 39; [11, 17] Eminent § 185; 
[12] Prohibition, §§ 11, 16 (1) ; [13] § 83, Pleading, 
§ 87; [15] JiJminent Domain, § 150; 26; [18] 
Municipal Corporations, § 98; [19 J § 8; [20 J 
Eminent Domain, § 25. 
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when court has no jurisdiction 
is available before final 
!d.-Other Remedies-Appeal.-vVhere an order is not appeal-
able hut is reviewable on appeal from subsequent judg-
sueh as expense of proceeding with 
from may operate to 
and prohibition a proper remedy. 
Appeal- Decisions Appealable.- An order overruling de-
murrer not 
[lla, Eminent Domain - Prohibition.-Where petitioners 
would be forced to g'o through expense of trial of eminent 
domain notion by city before appenl from judgment rendered 
therein would be available to them and before it would be 
for court to test city's right to exercise 
power of eminent domain outside its corporate limits, and 
allege that in interim partially constructed 
will suffer destruction from elements, thieves or van-
and that have been ordered by county to provide 
for walls of such partially constructed build-
at inerensed expense, they do not have speedy and adequate 
by appeal and prohibition is proper remedy. 
[12] Prohibition-When Writ Lies.-Prohibition will lie in case 
where it that otherwise failure of justice will occur 
in matter public importance by wrongful or excessive 
exercise of jurisdiction. 
[13] Pleading-Demurrer-Necessity That Objection Appear on 
Face of Pleading.-A demurrer reaches only matters appearing 
on face of pleading to which it is directed. 
[14] Id.- Demurrer- Grounds- Want of Jurisdiction.-A de-
marrer to jurisdiction of court of general jurisdiction lies 
only where want of jurisdiction appears affirmatively on face 
of 
[15] Eminent Domain-Proceedings-Pleadings.-Lack of juris-
diction appears from city's allegation that its action in eminent 
domain involves land outside its corporate limits without 
uH'fO''"'" its authority to condemn. 
Prohibition-Pleading.-Ordinarily sufficiency of complaint 
will not be inquired into on application for writ of prohibition, 
and where demurrer is erroneously overruled, litigant's only 
relief is appeal from final judgment; but when it is shown that 
court, in overruling demurrer, is proceeding without jurisdic-
tion over subject matter of action, prohibition may issue. 
Eminent Domain-Prohibition.-If there is neither express 
statutory authority nor case law authorizing city to proceed 
See Cal.Jur., Pleading, § 61; Am.Jur., Pleading, § 208. 




[18] Municipal Corporations-General Powers- Extraterritorial 
Powers.-Power of to 
necessarily or in or incident to powers 
granted, or essential to declared and purposes of cor-
poration. 
[19] Eminent Domain-Who May Exercise 
-A municipal corporation has no inherent power of eminent 
domain and can exercise it, if at all, only when expressly 
authorized by law. 
[20] Id.- Uses For Which Right May Be Exercised- Parking 
Facilities.-Word "purchase" as used in Gov. Code, § 37351, 
declaring that legislative body "may purchase, lease, or receive 
such personal property and real estate situated inside or out-
side the city limits as is necessary or proper for municipal 
purposes," may not be construed as expressly to authorize 
city to take private property for off-street parking outside its 
boundaries by eminent domain proce€dings. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Alameda County from further proceedings in an 
eminent domain action. vVrit granted. 
Popper & Burnstein and Hobert C. Burnstein for Peti-
tioners. 
J. F'. Coakley, District Attorney, R. Robert Hunter, Chief 
Assistant District Attorney, and Richard H. Klippert, Deputy 
District Attorney, for Respondent. 
John \V. Scanlon, City Attorney, Breed, Robinson & Stewart 
and Bestor Robinson, Special Counsel, for Real Party in In-
terest. 
CARTER, J.-Petitioners, William R Harden and Pearl B. 
Harden, his wife, Chester N. Harden and Virginia Hart 
Harden, his wife, seek a writ of prohibition to restrain further 
proceedings in an eminent domain action brought against them 
and other property mvners the city of Hayward. 
Petitioners own certain land in AlameC!a County, lying 
adjacent to, but outside the corporate boundaries of, the 
city of Hayward. On ,J nne 28, 1954, petitioners obtained 
a building permit from the county of Alameda which author-
()33 
construction. 




1954. and petitioners 
complaint. 
a fo}1owcd. 
1H1dition i o the above-mentioned facts. ne1it ioners allegt~ 
that nll 'York has be'm tho bnilding; that the 
construetod of bring lost or 
theft or vandalism and 
win suffer a loss in 
of Alameda has ordered 
masonry '.Yalls of the partially 
because of the abandonment of the 
eon:otrnetiou the ,1etermillation of the eondenmation 
c:nit. Pctiti(mers also that tbe Joss will suffer from 
the clestruetion of the strneture is not comprnsable 
an eminent domnin ae:ion mv1 that if forced 
the masm1ry walls, will suffer adcli-
contemled that the 's complaint 
that the adion in cminrnt domain is not 
of t hr sixth class may not exercise 
as to outside its cor-
with th" 
an appeal from 
and that a 
it::snc. The cit.'' filed 
mmnorn ndnm 
,;hould be 1k11 ied bl'canse 
that the petition 
remedy exists by way 









jurisdiction (Code Civ. Proc., 
squarely confronted with the referred to abovr. '' 
[3] \Ve went on to hold that when the trial court has heard 
and determined that it has jurisdiction, vYill lie 
to prevent the exercise thereof when that 
challenged in that court "by demurrer, motion, 
objection of some kind." [ 4] \Yhen the trial court has 
heard and determined the jurisdictional and has 
decided in favor of its own jurisdiction, and then proceeds to 
act-to try the cause on its merits, it may then be claimed 
ihat a court ·without jurisdiction is purporting to exercise it. 
Then, jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction has been exer-
cised and the higher courts will restrain the lower conrt from 
acting in excess of its ( v. 
Court, 19 Cal.2d 319 ; A.belleira v. District 
Court of Appeal, 17 CaL2d 280 [109 P.2d 132 A.IJ.l\. 
715]; Jackson v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 350 P.2d 
243, 113 A.L.R. 1422] .) 
The city contends that prohibition will not lie in that 
petitioners have a speedy and by 1vay of 
appeal. [5] As was held in Gorbache[f v. Justice's 
31 CaL2d 178, 180 [187 P.2d 407], the fact that an 
is available does in and of itself, 
resort to prohibition. [6] Section 1103 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure authorizes 
an appeal may be taken, if the 
quate. [7] In the usual situation an considered 
an adequate remedy, "but no hard and fast rule can be laid 
down to determine in adyance whether it fully meets the 
requirements of justice in a particular ease." 
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Tel. Co. v. Damenstein, 81 Cal.App.2d. 
, would be forced to 
the expense of trial of the eminent domain 
an appeal from the rendered therein 
to them and before it would be possible for 
court to test city's right to exercise the 
outside its limits. In 
that the partially constructed 
from the 
have been ordered by the 
for the walls of said 
It is 
~···v"~~ that in the event city should in the 
action, this additional expense would not 
as damages. The city argues that since 
values are fixed as of the date of issuance of summons (Code 
§ 1249) it is whether the 
concrete block walls or collapse. This contention 
does not answer that the expense to 
which will have been subjected complying with the 
order to the walls is not compensable, and 
that it not be. also that 
them is a parcel of a larger area 
resolution and that others besides 
themselves will be by the city's allegedly unauthorized 
exercise of its power of eminent domain. [12] We held in 
&; San Frwncisco v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 
P.2d 581], that prohibition would lie in 




of eminent domain in its 
as a Sixth the same is 
defined under the Constitution and Laws of the State of 
California, or ·whether it is to exer-
cise eminent domain as a ' ' under the Vehicle Parking 
District Law of 1943, the I.JaW of 1949 or the Parking 
District La1v of 1951.'' 'l'he that plaintiff 
sixth class; that its legis-
which it to 
defend-
that the 
or other objection of some 
[13] .A demurrer reaches matters appearing 
on the face of the to which it is directed (21 Cal.Jur., 
p. 94) ; [14] and a demurrer to the jurisdiction of a court of 
general lies 1vhere the want of jurisdiction 
appears affirmatiYely on the face of the (Doll v. 
Peller, 16 Cal. 432; 41 § 213, pp. 443, 444). 
[15] It may be said here that the lack of jurisdiction appears 
from the city's that the action involved land out-
side its corporate limits 'Without its authority to so 
eondemn. 














'fhe fact that the per-
\Yay forecloses the court 
eow;ti1utional aPd power to 
" In Northwestern Pac" R Co" Vo 
454 Po2d lOll 
failure of the to comply 
to maintain an eminrnt domain 
the Public Utilities Commis-
utility service" 
>vas, as contended by peti-
nor (~ase law, 
e1uincnt domain against 
e limii it \rou1d sPcm 
the trial court would 
in ibe rm1nent domain 
In Redlands High 8ch. Disf. 
eminent do rna in action 
boundaries and relies upon 
91 Cal. 238 [27 P. . Tl1e 
1111der section 1237 et seq. 
to condemn a 
"main " relied upon cor-
poration of the :fifth or sixth class as a condition prece-
dent to invoking the exercise of the pcnver or mninent 
make an effort to agree vdth the 0\Yner of the 
property or right 'which it seeks to 
that it in :my condemnation allege and 
prove that it has made that effort. The court held that this 
condition the uniform of a law 
''and is special in a case where a general la1v not can 
lw rnade applicable, but in vYlJich a law had been 
and in which there is no conceivable reason for 
rriserimination.'' 'fhe court cited section 1001 of the Civil 
Code which that an.1· person may acquire private 
property for any use in section 1238 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure and section 14 of the Civil Code which 
provides that a private or public is a "person," 
and section 1238 of the Code of Civil Proeednrr ·which ineludes 
''sewerage'' as one of the purposes for whiel1 
may be taken. \-Vhile the po·wer of Pasadena to exercise emi-
nent domain outside its Emits ·was not diseussed in 
the opinion, the case stands for the proposition 
that it does have the power. in "~l1llvme v. City 
San J 83 CaL , thP 
of the power of a emhwllt doma n outside 
its boundaries was involved. It was there said: ''In 
general, a nmnieipality is its bounda-
ries only in those easrs 
sec. 
Corporations, states 
rule is that without legis-
of the corporation is 
its acts ordinances have 
Thus, in the absence of 
caunot open a street, repair a 
aid in the construction of 
its boundaries. Sometimes 
--------..,--- boundaries may be 
HJ.ljJJ.J.t;u on ground of necessity, as for to obtain 
outlets for sewers and drains. . . . Likewise a municipality 
power to supply its inhabitants with water, may 
onrmn•n. for that purpose, a water supply without its terri-
... ' ( 4 on Municipal Corporations, § 1824.) '' 
The court continued : ''Therefore, in the case of a munici-
of the boundaries of the mu-
is upon legislative grant ; it 
not exist unless expressly granted, or fairly 
uutJ.uxou in or incident to the powers expressly or 
essential to the declared and purposes of corpo-
ration. (Hyatt v. 148 CaL 585, 587 [84 P. 41]; 
Pasadena v. Pasadena Land etc. Co., 152 Cal. 579, 
P. analogy the same rule applies in 
aeitermrnutg whether or not bonds of a municipal improve-
ment district may be the proceeds of which are to be 
used in the construction of public works outside of the bounda-
ries of the district." It was concluded that the act involved 
for and permitted only such public improvements 
Procedure which 
'' to the of this the 
domain may be exercised in behalf of the 
uses: 
'' 1. Off-street Off-street motor vehicle; 
places, necessary or eoJJvenient for 
thereto or egress established any 
and for 
The city's argument is that the above section of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, taken with sections 37351 and 
37353 of the Government it to acquire 
property outside its Section 37351 
provides in part: ''The may lease, 
m· Teeeive such and real estate situated in-
side or mdsicle the limits as is necessary or proper for 
municipal purposes. . " (Emphasis added.) Section 37353 
provides in part: '' 'fhe may property 
needed for: motor vehicles." It is claimed that 
these sections and section 1001 of Civil Code show that the 
subject of boundaries is extraneous to the exercise of the 
power of eminent domain for the situation set forth in 
subdivision 2 of section 1241. Section 1241 that 
when tvvo-thirds of the body of certain municipal 
corporations, including pass a resolution or ordinance 
finding that the public interest and the tak-
ing, that finding is conclusive evidence on the question of 
necessity as to within the 'fhe section also 
provides that "said resolution ordinance shall not be such 
conclusive evidence in the case of the any county, 
city and county, or or school dis-
trict, or irrigation, public or water of property 
located outside of the territorial limits thereof.'' (Emphasis 
added.) It is contended that by "clear implication," the sec-











inal Law, § 994; 
§ 986; [7] Criminal 
inal Law, § 1022; 
§58; [12] Criminal Law, § 1022. 
